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NOTES
PRISONERS' FREE SPEECH RIGHTS: THE RIGHT
TO RECEIVE PUBLICATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal courts have recently intervened in prison affairs to test the
constitutionality of regulations that restrict prisoners' receipt of publica-
tions. 1 Due to the lack of Supreme Court guidance, the lower federal
courts have taken inconsistent approaches. Many courts have unnecessar-
ily banned publications and thus, perhaps unwittingly, may have retarded
inmates' rehabilitation and contributed to the high rates of recidivism.
Furthermore, much needless litigation has ensued and will continue until
the Court develops a uniform standard for analysis of first amendment
free speech rights in the prison context.
This Note considers the appropriate standard for determining whether
a ban on prisoners' receipt of publications is constitutional. It first
discusses the right to free speech guaranteed by the first amendment and
the confusion wrought by the right's emerging role in prison affairs. It
then analyzes the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Procunier
v. Martinez2 to test the constitutionality of restrictions on inmates'
personal correspondence with those outside the prison community. After
a discussion of the standard enunciated in Pell v. Procunier3 , in which
inmates' visitation rights were at issue, this Note demonstrates how
lower federal courts extended but misapplied the Martinez test to limit
prisoners' receipt of publications. Finally, it reviews the Court's recent
decision in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.4
1. See, e.g., Carpenter v. South Dakota, 536 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1976); Aikens v.
Jenkins, 534 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1976); Morgan v. LaVallee, 526 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1975);
Gaugh v. Schmidt, 498 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Hopkins v. Collins, 411 F.
Supp. 831 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd in pertinent part, 548 F.2d 503 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam);
Cofone v. Manson, 409 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Conn. 1976); Paka v. Manson, 387 F. Supp. 111
(D. Conn. 1974); The Luparar v. Stoneman, 382 F. Supp. 495 (D. Vt. 1974), appeal
dismissed mem., 517 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1975); Frazier v. Donelon, 381 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.
La. 1974), aff'd mem., 520 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 923 (1976);
McCleary v. Kelly, 376 F. Supp. 1186 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Gray v. Creamer, 376 F. Supp. 675
(W.D. Pa. 1974); Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
2. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
3. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
4. 97 S. Ct. 2532 (1977).
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regarding prisoners' receipt of bulk mail. It concludes that Jones is an
aberration, and that courts should apply the Martinez standard when
prisoners' receipt of publications is at issue.
I1. FIRST AMENDMENT FREE SPEECH ANALYSIS
A. Ad Hoc Balancing
The first amendment,5 made applicable to the states by the fourteenth, 6
protects free speech. 7 It also protects the correlative right to receive
information and ideas.8 The right to free speech, however, is not abso-
lute;9 societal interests such as public order and national security qualify
the right. 10
Courts have confronted the complex problem of developing an in-
terpretation of the first amendment that properly balances the competing
interests. 1 The Supreme Court first adopted a standard that permitted the
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech. .. ."
6. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 95 (1940); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I
provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States . ... "
7. For a comprehensive discussion of the right to free speech, see T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970) [hereinafter cited as FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION]; Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Toward a General Theory] (subsequently published as T.
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966)).
8. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 482 (1965); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). For a discussion of the
right to know, see Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH.
U.L.Q. 1.
9. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) ("[W]e reject the view
that freedom of speech and association . . . as protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, are 'absolutes'. . . ."); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382, 399 (1950) ("We have never held that such freedoms [first amendment rights]
are absolute."); Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the
First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1, 5 (1965) ("[T]he absolute view has not prevailed
within the Court. A majority of the Justices from time to time have recognized some
contexts in which government has power to curb speech as such."). But see, e.g., Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The First Amendment,
its prohibition in terms absolute, was designed to preclude courts as well as legislatures
from weighing the values of speech against silence.").
10. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258,267 (1967) ("[W]hile the Constitu-
tion protects against invasions of individual rights, it does not withdraw from the Govern-
ment the power to safeguard its vital interests."). In Robel, the important governmental
interest was national defense. See Toward a General Theory, supra note 7, at 907.
11. E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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government to limit free speech when its exercise might deleteriously
affect the public welfare.12 The belief that this test allowed too great a
restriction on free speech led to the adoption of the "clear and present
danger" test,13 which required an imminent threat to legitimate govern-
mental interests before free speech could be infringed. 14
Since the 1950 decision in American Communications Association v.
Douds,'5 the Court has frequently engaged in ad hoc balancing16 to
12. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,667 (1925) ("That a State in the exercise of
its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the
public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public
peace, is not open to question."). This doctrine has been labeled the "bad tendency" test.
See Toward a General Theory, supra note 7, at 909.
13. Justice Holmes articulated the "clear and present danger" test in Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). He stated: "The question in every case is whether the
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent." Id. at 52. In Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), Justice Brandeis
elaborated on Justice Holmes' formulation of the test: "That the necessity which is
essential to a valid restriction does not exist unless speech would produce, or is intended
to produce, a clear and imminent danger of some substantive evil which the State
constitutionally may seek to prevent has been settled." Id. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring).
[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the
incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is
opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.
Id. at 377.
For a discussion of this test, see Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined:
Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970); McKay, The
Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1182, 1203-12 (1959).
14. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
15. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
16. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 91
(1961) ("Against the impediments which particular governmental regulation causes to
entire freedom of individual action, there must be weighed the value to the public of the
ends which the regulation may achieve."); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 51 (1961)
("Whenever, in such a context, these constitutional protections [the first amendment's
protection of free speech as made applicable to the states by the fourteenth] are asserted
against the exercise of valid governmental powers a reconciliation must be effected, and
that perforce requires an appropriate weighing of the respective interests involved.");
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) ("Decision in this case must finally
turn, therefore, on whether the cities . . . have demonstrated so cogent an interest in
obtaining and making public the membership lists ... as to justify the substantial
abridgment of associational freedom which such disclosures will effect."). In Douds itself
the Court stated:
In essence, the problem is one of weighing the probable effects of the statute
upon the free exercise of the right of speech and assembly against the congres-
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decide whether the government's interest in prohibiting the expression
outweighs the individual's right to free speech.1 7 To limit first amend-
ment freedoms, the government must establish a compelling interest in
regulating the activity in question 8 and adopt means that do not unneces-
sarily infringe free speech. 19
Courts have articulated various standards incorporating the "compel-
ling state interest" and "least restrictive means" requirements.20 For
example, in United States v. O'Brien,21 the Court enunciated a two-
prong test whereby a governmental regulation prohibiting symbolic
speech is justified if it furthers an important governmental interest unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression, and if the incidental restric-
tion on free speech is essential to further that interest.22
sional determination that political strikes are evils of conduct which cause sub-
stantial harm to interstate commerce and that Communists and others identified
by § 9(h) pose continuing threats to that public interest when in positions of union
leadership.
339 U.S. at 400.
17. 339 U.S. at 400.
18. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) ("The decisions of this
Court have consistently held that only a compelling state interest in the regulation of a
subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First
Amendment freedoms."); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) ("Where
there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon
showing a subordinating interest which is compelling.").
19. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 41 (1976) (per curiam); Schneider v.
Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 24 (1968) ("[Ain Act touching on First Amendment rights must be
narrowly drawn so that the precise evil is exposed .... "); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 438 (1963) ("Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect ...
Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most
precious freedoms."). The Court in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), stated:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means
that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the
light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
Id. at 488 (footnotes omitted). See generally Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the
Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REv. 254, 267-93 (1964); Note, Less Drastic Means
and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
20. See, e.g., cases cited notes 18-19 supra; cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 304 (1940) ("[T]he power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a
permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.") (first amendment right to
freedom of religion was at issue).
21. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien was convicted for burning his draft card to symbolize
his opposition to the Vietnam War. He contended that Congress had enacted the law to
suppress free expression and that it was therefore unconstitutional. The Supreme Court
stated that although conduct was involved, the first amendment's protection of free
speech applied; however, the presence of communicative intent did not immunize the
burning of the draft card from governmental regulation.
22. Id. at 377.
[Vol., 1977:649
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B. Public Forum Doctrine
The Supreme Court initially rejected the notion that citizens had a
constitutional right to use governmental property as a public forum.23 In
Hague v. CIO,24 however, Justice Roberts stated that citizens had histor-
ically used streets and parks to assemble and speak and that the state
could not interfere with this activity.25 Although Hague was a plurality
opinion,26 Justice Roberts' reasoning was later adopted by courts that
reviewed restrictions on citizens' exercise of first amendment speech
rights in parks and streets.27
23. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897), aff'g Commonwealth v. Davis, 162
Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895), which was articulated by Oliver Wendell Holmes. The
Supreme Court quoted with approval the following statement by Holmes: "For the
Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public
park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner
of a private house to forbid it in his house." 167 U.S. at 47 (quoting 162 Mass. at 511, 39
N.E. at 113). The Supreme Court also stated: "The right to absolutely exclude all right to
use, necessarily includes the authority to determine under what circumstances such use
may be availed of, as the greater power contained the lesser." 167 U.S. at 48.
For a discussion of the public forum doctrine, see Horning, The First Amendment Right
to a Public Forum, 1969 DUKE L.J. 931; Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v.
Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974
SuP. CT. REV. 233; Note, The Public Forum: Minimum Access, Equal Access, and the
First Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REV. 117 (1975).
24. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
25. Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discus-
sing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of
all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the
general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order;
but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.
Id. at 515-16.
26. It is unclear how many justices agreed with Justice Roberts' statement. In his
dissent in Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 568 n.1 (1948), Justice Jackson said that only
one, or at most two, justices agreed with Roberts' analysis. Although he did not specify
how many justices supported Roberts' approach, Kalven, supra note 23, at 14, stated that
it was most likely more than two. Whatever the number, it is clear that the members of the
Court disagreed on how to analyze the exercise of free speech rights in streets and public
parks.
27. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293 (1951); Jamison v. Texas, 318
U.S. 413, 415-16 (1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941); FREEDOM OF
E PRESSION, supra note 7, at 301; Stone, supra note 23, at 239.
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Whether other public or quasi-public28 places were public forums
remained unresolved until Brown v. Louisiana.29 By protecting the silent
protest of five blacks who had entered a public library to express their
objections to its segregation policy, the Brown plurality extended the
public forum doctrine. 3° Because the protest did not disrupt "library
activities,''31 the plurality believed it could not be prohibited 2 even
though protests had not traditionally been held in libraries.33
Subsequently, the extended public forum doctrine gained popularity.34
28. This Note adopts Emerson's usage of "quasi-public" to denote privately owned
places that are "used in such a way as in effect to be dedicated to public use; or the
government may have such a relationship to the property or the owner as to stamp the
property with governmental attributes." FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 7, at 307.
29. 383 U.S. 131 (1966). As Stone, supra note 23, at 246 n.54, suggests, Brown, not
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963), is the watershed case. Because Edwards
involved a protest on the South Carolina State House grounds, which were traditionally
used as a public forum, it could easily be analogized to cases in which protests were
conducted on public streets and in parks, and could be brought within the parameters of
the Hague doctrine. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1966) ("Traditionally, state
capitol grounds are open to the public.").
30. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas joined Justice Fortas who stated:
We are here dealing with an aspect of a basic constitutional right-the right under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments guaranteeing freedom of speech and of
assembly, and freedom to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances. . . .[This right] certainly include[s] the right in a peaceable and orderly
manner to protest by silent and reproachful presence, in a place where the
protestant has every right to be ....
383 U.S. at 141-42.
31. Id. at 142.
32. Id.
33. See Stone, supra note 23, at 247. After describing Fortas' analysis, he stated:
"[iThe important first step had been taken toward acceptance of the view that the right to
a public forum could extend, in at least some instances, even to publicly owned property
that manifestly was not historically dedicated to the exercise of First Amendment rights."
Apparently, whether the activity interfered with a place's normal usage was the prime
concern.
34. In Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), the Court upheld the conviction of
students who had peacefully protested on jail grounds. Significantly, though, four justices
dissented (Chief Justice Warren, Justice Brennan, Justice Douglas, and Justice Fortas).
The following excerpt from the dissent explains in greater detail than Brown the tenets of
the extended public forum doctrine:
There may be some public places which are so clearly committed to other
purposes that their use for the airing of grievances is anomalous. There may be
some instances in which assemblies and petitions for redress of grievances are
not consistent with other necessary purposes of public property. A noisy meeting
may be out of keeping with the serenity of the statehouse or the quiet of the
courthouse. No one, for example, would suggest that the Senate gallery is the
proper place for a vociferous protest rally. And in other cases it may be necessary
to adjust the right to petition for redress of grievances to the other interests
inhering in the uses to which the public property is normally put. . . .But this is
quite different from saying that all public places are off limits to people with
[Vol. 1977:649
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The Court, in Flower v. United States, 35 held that the military could not
prevent Flower from peacefully distributing leaflets: although he was on
a military base, he was in an area open to the public and the military had
no "special interest" in prohibiting the dissemination of leaflets there.36
The Court clearly expanded the public forum doctrine as articulated in
Hague. Military bases have traditionally not been associated with the
unimpeded exercise of free speech rights.37 Nevertheless, the Court
thought the restriction unjustifiable.38
In Grayned v. City of Rockford,39 the Court articulated its test for
determining when governmental authorities may infringe first amend-
ment speech rights of persons on public property:' "[t]he crucial ques-
tion is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with
the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time."41
grievances. . . . And it is farther yet from saying that the "custodian" of the
public property in his discretion can decide when public places shall be used for
the communication of ideas, especially the constitutional right to assemble and
petition for redress of grievances. . . . For to place such discretion in any public
official, be he the "custodian" of the public property or the local police commis-
sioner . . . is to place those who assert their First Amendment rights at his
mercy. It gives him the awesome power to decide whose ideas may be expressed
and who shall be denied a place to air their claims and petition their government.
Such power is out of step with all our decisions prior to today where we have
insisted that before a First Amendment right may be curtailed under the guise of a
criminal law, any evil that may be collateral to the exercise of the right, must be
isolated and defined in a "narrowly drawn" statute. . . lest the power to control
excess of conduct be used to suppress the constitutional right itself.
Id. at 54-55 (citations omitted).
35. 407 U.S. 197 (1972) (per curiam).
36. Id. at 198.
37. In Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976), the Court said: "The notion that
federal military reservations, like municipal streets and parks, have traditionally served as
a place for free public assembly and communication of thoughts by private citizens is thus
historically and constitutionally false." See FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 7, at 58
"Access to military installations for purposes of exercising the right of free speech is also
subject to different rules than is access to non-military public places.").
38. 407 U.S. at 198 ("The base commandant can no more order petitioner off this
public street because he was distributing leaflets than could the city police order any
leafleteer off any public street.").
39. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
40. Grayned had been convicted under a municipal ordinance prohibiting "noisy or
diversionary activity that disrupts or is about to disrupt normal school activities." Id. at
11l. The Court, believing the ordinance was a reasonable time, place, and manner
regulation, upheld the conviction. Id. at 121.
41. Id. at 116. These words are from the following paragraph in which the Court
further articulated the appropriate public forum analysis:
The nature of a place, "the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of
regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable." Although a silent
vigil may not unduly interfere with a public library. . . making a speech in the
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In Greer v. Spock,42 however, the Court shifted from this mode of
analysis.43 It upheld the constitutionality of Army base regulations that
reading room almost certainly would. That same speech should be perfectly
appropriate in a park. The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is
basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular
time. Our cases make clear that in assessing the reasonableness of a regulation,
we must weigh heavily the fact that communication is involved; the regulation
must be narrowly tailored to further the State's legitimate interest.
Id. at 116-17 (footnotes and citations omitted).
42. 424 U.S. 828 (1976). For a discussion of Greer, see Zillman & Imwinkelried, The
Legacy of Greer v. Spock: The Public Forum Doctrine and the Principle of the Military's
Political Neutrality, 65 GEo. L.J. 773 (1977).
43. The Court had earlier rejected the Grayned approach in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507 (1976), which involved a quasi-public place. Because an understanding of quasi-
public forum cases may prove helpful when analyzing Greer, an overview follows. In
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), the Court overturned the conviction of Jehovah's
Witnesses for distributing religious literature on the streets of a company-owned town on
the ground that the town did not "function differently from any other town." Id. at 508.
In Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), the Court
relied on Marsh to hold that the first amendment protects peaceful picketing at a shopping
center to protest the practices of a business in the center.
All we decide here is that because the shopping center serves as the community
business block "and is freely accessible and open to the people in the area and
those passing through," . . . the State may not delegate the power, through the
use of its trespass laws, wholly to exclude those members of the public wishing to
exercise their First Amendment rights on the premises in a manner and for a
purpose generally consonant with the use to which the property is actually put.
Id. at 319-20 (footnotes and citations omitted). The Court thus extended the public forum
doctrine.
In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), however, the Court retreated. It upheld
the conviction of protestors who had distributed at a shopping center leaflets that
criticized United States' Vietnam policy. Lloyd did not explicitly overrule Logan Valley,
but many commentators believed these two cases were irreconcilable. See, e.g., Note,
Labor Picketing On Private Property and the Vexation of Logan Valley: The Nixon Court
Responds in Hudgens v. NLRB, 6 CAP. U.L. REv. 235, 253 n.82 (1976); Note, Private
Business Districts and the First Amendment: From Marsh to Tanner, 7 URB. L. ANN. 199,
21 1-12 (1974); Comment, Hudgens v. NLRB-A FinalDefinition of the Pu blic Forum?, 13
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 139, 144 (1977).
In Hudgens, the Court held that a labor union member did not have a first amendment
right to picket at a shopping center against the policies of a company operating retail stores
there. In reaching this result, the Court stated that Lloyd had demonstrated an intention to
limit the use of the public forum doctrine, at least when the forum was quasi-public.
Whether this approach would extend to purely public places remained to be seen. Quasi-
public places could easily be distinguished because of property rights granted to individu-
als by the fifth amendment of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "[N]or
shall [any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Indeed, lower
federal courts seized upon the distinction to avoid the use of quasi-public forum cases as
precedent for situations in which the place was public. See, e.g., Spock v. David, 469 F.2d
1047, 1054-55 (3d Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976);
CCCO-Western Region v. Fellows, 359 F. Supp. 644, 651 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Stone, supra
note 23, at 236 n.9, said his article would not consider quasi-public places. This may
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prohibited political speeches and rallies and conditioned the distribution
of publications upon the base commander's approval.' The Court distin-
guished Flower on the ground that the military commander there had
abandoned " 'any claim [of] special interests in who walks, talks, or
distributes leaflets on the avenue.' "45 In addition, the armed forces had
to be ready to fight wars if necessary. 46 Because of this special function,
military commanders have traditionally had the power to bar civilians
from the base.47 Military bases were thus distinguishable from streets and
parks because they have not been used as places "for free public
assembly and communication of thoughts by private citizens. "48 Accord-
ingly, no first amendment right to engage in the prohibited activities
existed.4 9
indicate a belief that private ownership required an approach different from that taken
when public property was involved.
44. These regulations were those of Fort Dix.
Ft. Dix Reg. 210-26 (1968). . . provides that "[d]emonstrations, picketing, sit-
ins, protest marches, political speeches and similar activities are prohibited and
will not be conducted on the Fort Dix Military Reservation.". . . Fort Dix Reg.
210-27 (1970) provides that "[tjhe distribution or posting of any publication,
including newspapers, magazines, handbills, flyers, circulars, pamphlets or other
writings issued, published or otherwise prepared by any person, persons, agency
or agencies. . . is prohibited on the Fort Dix Military Reservation without prior
written approval of the Adjutant General, this headquarters."
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. at 831.
Dr. Spock and other candidates for political office, desiring to make political speeches
and distribute campaign literature, sought a preliminary injunction in federal district court
prohibiting Ft. Dix military authorities from enforcing these regulations. They were joined
by four others who challenged the ban on distribution of literature without prior approval.
Spock v. David, 349 F. Supp. 179 (D.N.J.), rev'd, 469 F.2d 1047 (3d. Cir. 1972), rev'd sub
nom. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). The court denied plaintiff's request for
injunctive relief. 349 F. Supp. at 182. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed as to the
political candidates, ordering military authorities to refrain from interfering with the
candidates' campaign speeches and the distribution of campaign literature on their behalf
until the upcoming election. 469 F.2d at 1056. The court of appeals upheld the denial of
injunctive relief as to the other petitioners. Id.
45. 424 U.S. at 835 (quoting Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. at 198). In Flower, it
was significant that the first amendment activity engaged in (peacefully distributing
pamphlets) was on a street open to the public. The part of the military base in Greer where
the petitioners sought to make speeches and distribute pamphlets, however, was no less
open despite the Court's assertion to the contrary. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. at 850-51
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Spock v. David, 469 F.2d at 1054.
46. 424 U.S. at 837-38.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. The Court evidently thought it unnecessary to balance the competing
interests. It did not inquire whether the military had a compelling interest in excluding
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Justice Powell agreed with the judgment but aptly criticized its rea-
soning.5" He noted that first amendment speech rights, although not
absolute, may be restricted only when essential to further a compelling
governmental interest.51 Thus, although a place's primary purpose is
unrelated to a public forum, a person may have a right to use the premises
as such. 2 Similarly, even if some disruption results, infringing first
amendment rights may not be permissible 53 unless there exists "some
basic incompatibility" between the nature of the place and the first
amendment activity. 4 He rejected sub silentio the argument that the
availability of first amendment rights depended on a place's historical
usage.
II. PRISONERS' RIGHTS
A. Hands-off Doctrine
Courts once viewed prisoners as slaves of the state56 who should suffer
these people or whether, assuming arguendo it had this interest, the means used were
unduly broad. An inquiry into a place's historical usage seemed to suffice.
50. Id. at 842-49 (Powell, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 842.
52. Id. at 843.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Rather than relying on Hague, Justice Powell cited Grayned and Tinker to estab-
lish the analytical framework he thought the majority should have used. Id. at 842-43. He
seemed to agree with one commentator who stated: "Places are not in themselves
necessarily anomalous for all expression; the key factor is the amount of disruption
generated by a particular mode of expression exercised in a given setting." Note, supra
note 23, at 138 (emphasis in original).
56. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 231 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting): "At one
time, the prevailing view was that the deprivation [of liberty following conviction] was
essentially total. The penitentiary inmate was considered 'the slave of the State.' "
Stevens noted that the thirteenth amendment gave "some support" to that viewpoint. Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 provides: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." (emphasis
added). Lower federal courts have also recognized that prisoners had been considered
slaves of the state. See, e.g., Sostre v. Preiser, 519 F. 2d 763,764 (2d Cir. 1975); Bonner v.
Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir. 1975); Jackson v. Goodwin, 400 F.2d 529, 532 (5th
Cir. 1968).
In Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790 (1871), the court said:[O]ne of the most effectual means of promoting the common benefit and ensuring
the protection and security of the people, is the certain punishment and preven-
tion of crime. It is essential to the safety of society, that those who violate its
criminal laws should suffer punishment. A convicted felon, whom the law in its
humanity punishes by confinement in the penitentiary instead of with death, is
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for the crimes they had committed.57 Because inmates could have been
put to death but for the state's humanity,58 they were entitled only to that
which the state chose to accord them.59 Thus, they forfeited the rights
they had possessed as freemen.'
In 1944, however, the Sixth Circuit stated: "A prisoner retains all the
rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary
implication, taken from him by law." 61 Nonetheless, the notion that
inmates had rights was in an embryonic stage. Most courts considered
prison administration beyond judicial scrutiny even when a deprivation
of constitutional rights was alleged.62 Under the "hands-off" doctrine,63
the judiciary deferred to prison officials' judgment. 64 The principle of
subject while undergoing that punishment, to all the laws which the Legislature in
its wisdom may enact for the government of that institution and the control of its
inmates. For the time being, during his term of service in the penitentiary, he is in
a state of penal servitude to the State. He has, as a consequence of his crime, not
only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in
its humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of the State. He is
civiliter mortuus; and his estate, if he has any, is administered like that of a dead
man.
The bill of rights is a declaration of general principles to govern a society of
freemen, and not of convicted felons and men civilly dead. Such men have some
rights it is true, such as the law in its benignity accords to them, but not the rights
of freemen. They are the slaves of the State undergoing punishment for heinous
crimes committed against the laws of the land. While in this state of penal
servitude, they must be subject to the regulations of the institution of which they
are inmates, and the laws of the State to whom their service is due in expiation of
their crimes.
Id. at 795-96.
57. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 795-96 (1871).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944) (per curiam), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 887 (1945).
62. See, e.g., Eaton v. Bibb, 217 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 915
(1955); Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954);
Dayton v. McGranery, 201 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Henson v. Welch, 199 F.2d 367 (4th
Cir. 1952) (per curiam); Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1952); Williams v. Steele,
194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 822 (1952); Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986 (9th
Cir. 1948).
63. This term originated in Fritch, Civil Rights of Federal Prison Inmates 31 (1961)
(unpublished document prepared for the Federal Bureau of Prisons).
64. See, e.g., cases cited note 62 supra. For a discussion of the hands-off doctrine,
see Fox, The First Amendment Rights of Prisoners, 63 J. C Im. L.C. & P.S. 162, 162-66
(1972); Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners'Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175,
181-85 (1970); Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA.
L. REv. 985, 987-92 (1962) [hereinafter cited as The Developing Law]; Note, Beyond the
Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72
YALE L.J. 506, 515-26 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Beyond the Ken].
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separation of powers and the possibility that prison discipline would
deteriorate militated against intervention. 65 Federalism and notions of
comity also supported non-intervention when state prisoners filed peti-
tions in federal court.'
Despite the "hands-off" doctrine, courts increasingly have recognized
their duty to uphold the Constitution in prison and have gradually carved
out exceptions to this doctrine.67 As early as 1941, in Ex parte Hull,68
prisoners were accorded a due process right of access to court. 69 Al-
though Hull attacked the validity of his conviction and not the conditions
of his confinement,70 this suit and its progeny7' weakened the "hands-
off" doctrine. Once prisoners were assured a forum, they could chal-
lenge prison administrators' actions that infringed other constitutional
rights. 72
65. See, e.g., Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330, 331 (10th Cir. 1949) ("The prison
system is under the administration of the Attorney General. . . and not of the district
courts. The court has no power to interfere with the conduct of the prison or its disci-
pline."); Golub v. Krimsky, 185 F. Supp. 783, 784 (S.DN.Y. 1960) (The court refused to
allow inmates to sue the prison warden for failure to provide adequate medical care. It
said: "We incline to the proposition that to allow such actions would be prejudicial to the
proper maintenance of discipline."). Although rarely articulated, an underlying rationale
for the judiciary's hesitancy to intervene in prison affairs was its lack of expertise. Courts
thought prison authorities were more qualified to handle internal prison matters because
these officials were exposed daily to the practical problems of prison administration. See
Fox, supra note 64, at 163; Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 64, at 181.
66. See, e.g., United States exrel. Morris v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d 105,107
(7th Cir. 1953): "[Petitioner] is an inmate of a State penitentiary, by reason of a conviction
of a State offense. The warden is not a federal official. Federal courts will rarely intervene
to interfere with the conduct of State officials carrying out their duties under State laws."
67. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966).
68. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
69. Id. at 549. ("mhe state and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner's
right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.") (emphasis added). Prison
officials had prevented Hull from filing a habeas petition in the Supreme Court under a
prison regulation that accorded prison authorities discretion in determining whether an
inmate could file such petitions.
70. Id. at 550.
71. E.g., Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Bailleaux v.
Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959), rev'd sub nom. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d
632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961).
72. For a brief discussion of the importance of the access to court cases, see Goldfarb
& Singer, supra note 64, at 183; The Developing Law, supra note 64, at 987-88. The Court
has recently expanded prisoners' right of access to court. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817 (1977): "We hold, therefore, that the fundamental constitutional right of access to the
courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of mean-
ingful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assist-
ance from persons trained in the law." Id. at 828.
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In the 1960s, courts began to intervene when prison officials impeded
inmates' free exercise of religion 73 or discriminated on the basis of race.74
Perhaps they thought it irrational to ignore inmates' claims that prison
authorities had violated their constitutional rights when the judiciary had
begun to inquire into allegedly unconstitutional conduct of law enforce-
ment officials. 75 Shortly thereafter, some courts invalidated prison regu-
lations that restricted inmates' freedom of speech.76 Others, however,
continued to defer to prison officials' decisions limiting this right, by
articulating one or more of the rationales for the "hands-off" doctrine. 77
B. Tension Betwen "Hands-Off" and First Amendment
Speech Rights
This tension between the "hands-off" doctrine and the need to protect
prisoners' free speech rights, led the lower federal courts to adopt
Bounds also provides a review of other recent Supreme Court decisions that have
attempted to "insure that inmate access to the courts is adequate, effective, and meaning-
ful." Id. at 822.
73. See, e.g., Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969); Barnett v. Rodgers,
410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968); Roberts v.
Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963); Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961). For
a general discussion of freedom of religion in prison, see Brown, Black Muslim Prisoners
and Religious Discrimination: The Developing Criteria for Judicial Review, 32 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1124 (1964); Frankino, Manacles and the Messenger: A Short Study in Religious
Freedom in the Prison Community, 14 CATH. U.L. REV. 30 (1965); Comment, Black
Muslims in Prison: Of Muslim Rites and Constitutional Rights, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1488
(1962); Note, Suits by Black Muslim Prisoners to Enforce Religious Rights-Obstacles to a
Hearing on the Merits, 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 528 (1966); Comment, The Religious Rights of
the Incarcerated, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 812 (1977).
74. See, e.g., Jackson v. Goodwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968); Rivers v. Royster,
360 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1966); Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1968), aff'd,
393 U.S. 266 (1968) (per curiam); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966),
aff'd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam).
75. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 64, at 183-84,
set forth this rationale.
76. See, e.g., Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F. 2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971); Sobell v. Reed, 327
F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Conn. 1971);
Payne v. Whitmore, 325 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319
F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970);
Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
77. See, e.g., Krupnick v. Crouse, 366 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1966); Lee v. Tahash, 352
F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965) (except when prison mail regulations discriminate on the basis of
race or religion); Pope v. Daggett, 350 F.2d 296 (10th Cir. 1965); McCloskey v. Maryland,
337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964).
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confusing and disparate approaches when testing the constitutionality of
prison mail regulations.7 8 The conflicting approaches taken in the
Morales trilogy are illustrative. 79 The district court enjoined prison
officials from prohibiting correspondence between inmates and outsiders
because the officials had failed to establish a "compelling state inter-
est.""0 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the appropriate test
was whether an official's action "bears a rational relationship to or is
reasonably necessary for the advancement of a justifiable purpose. "81 On
rehearing en banc, the court of appeals used a stricter standard to reverse
once again; the proper test was whether the "restriction is related both
reasonably and necessarily to the advancement of a justifiable purpose of
imprisonment. "82
C. Procunier v. Martinez
In 1974, .the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of free speech
rights in the prison environment. In Procunier v. Martinez,83 the Court
considered the constitutionality of prison mail regulations banning inmate
correspondence that "unduly complain[ed], magnified grievances,
express[ed] inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views," or
contained matter deemed "defamatory" or "otherwise inappropriate. "84
78. Compare Jackson v. Goodwin, 400 F.2d 529, 541 (5th Cir. 1968) (state must show
substantial and controlling interest), with Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965)
(hands-off approach), and Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901, 905 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (there must be showing of clear and present danger), and Carothers v. Follette, 314
F. Supp. 1014, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (regulation must be related both reasonably and
necessarily to some justifiable purpose of imprisonment). For a good discussion of prison
mail regulations, see Note, Prison Mail Censorship and the First Amendment, 81 YALE
L.J. 87 (1971).
79. See Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Wis. 1972), rev'd, 489 F.2d 1335
(7th Cir. 1973), rev'd en banc, 494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974).
80. 340 F. Supp. at 555.
81. 489 F.2d at 1343.
82. 494 F.2d at 87.
83. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
84. Martinez footnoted to the pertinent regulations as follows:
Director's Rule 1201 provided:
"INMATE BEHAVIOR: Always conduct yourself in an orderly manner. Do not
fight or take part in horseplay or physical encounters except as part of the regular
athletic program. Do not agitate, unduly complain, magnify grievances, or behave
in any way which might lead to violence."
It is undisputed that the phrases 'unduly complain' and 'magnify grievances' were
applied to personal correspondence.
Director's Rule 1205 provided:
"The following is contraband:
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Prison authorities claimed that it was within their discretion to pros-
cribe "defamatory" or "otherwise inappropriate" statements.85 In de-
fending the ban on statements that "unduly complain" or "magnify
grievances," prison officials contended their actions furthered such gov-
ernmental interests as the deterrence of flash riots and the advancement
of prisoner rehabilitation.86 Furthermore, they argued that the proscrip-
tion on the expression of "inflammatory political, racial, religious, or
other views" was necessary to ensure the internal security of the
prison.17
Although Martinez invalidated these prison mail regulations,88 the
majority failed to confront the troublesome issue of prisoners' rights; rather,
it based its decision on the right of outsiders to communicate with
inmates.8 9 In addition, the Court expressly declined to address the issue
"d. Any writings or voice recordings expressing inflammatory political, ra-
cial, religious or other views or beliefs when not in the immediate possession of
the originator, or when the originator's possession is used to subvert prison
discipline by display or circulation."
Rule 1205 also provides that writings "not defined as contraband under this rule,
but which, if circulated among other inmates, would in the judgment of the
warden or superintendent tend to subvert prison order or discipline, may be
placed in the inmate's property, to which he shall have access under supervi-
sion."
Id. at 399 nn. 2 & 3. Two inmates in a California state prison had initiated a class action
suit on behalf of themselves and all other inmates under the jurisdiction of the California
Department of Corrections challenging the constitutionality of prison mail regulations
promulgated by the Director of Corrections. A three-judge district court held these
regulations infringed inmates' first amendment free speech rights. Martinez v. Procunier,
354 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (per curiam), aff'd on other grounds, 416 U.S. 396
(1974). For a general discussion of Martinez, see Note, A Giant Step Backwards: The
Supreme Court Speaks Out on Prisoners' First Amendment Rights, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 352
(1975); 79 DICK. L. REx. 352 (1975); 6 SETON HALL L. REv. 167 (1974).
85. 416 U.S. at 415-16.
86. Id. at 416.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 415.
89. In determining the proper standard of review for prison restrictions on inmate
correspondence, we have no occasion to consider the extent to which an individu-
al's right to free speech survives incarceration, for a narrower basis of decision is
at hand. In the case of direct personal correspondence between inmates and those
who have a particularized interest in communicating with them, mail censorship
implicates more than the right of prisoners.
Communication by letter is not accomplished by the act of writing words on
paper. Rather, it is effected only when the letter is read by the addressee. Both
parties to the correspondence have an interest in securing that result, and censor-
ship of the communication between them necessarily impinges on the interest of
each. Whatever the status of a prisoner's claim to uncensored correspondence
with an outsider, it is plain that the latter's interest is grounded in the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.
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of mass mailings 9° and did not mention publications that were mailed
piecemeal.
By basing its decision on the rights of nonprisoners, the majority failed to
ensure that protection of prisoners' free speech interests would be more
than haphazard and inconsistent. Yet, as Justice Marshall noted in con-
currence, an inmate has a right, not a mere privilege, to protection of his
first amendment freedoms. 91 A person does not lose all his rights when
he becomes a prisoner; 92 rather, he retains all the rights of outsiders
except those he must relinquish because of the prison environment and its
objectives. 93 Thus, prisoners should be accorded free speech rights
unless there is a compelling governmental interest militating against the
exercise of this right, and the government, in limiting this right, uses
means that are not "unnecessarily restrictive of personal freedoms." 94
In addition, the failure to hold that inmates have free speech rights may
lead lower courts to defer to prison authorities in other cases involving
claims of prisoners' rights. This could result in frequent abuse and
unnecessary deprivation of prisoners' rights in other areas. 95 Yet, arbi-
Id. at 408. Martinez clearly held that the first amendment protected the correspondence
even if the outsider were the intended recipient of the communication. Id. at 408-09.
90. Id. at408 n.l1.
91. Id. at 423.
92. Id. at 422.
93. Id. at 422-23.
94. Id. at 423.
95. Prison conditions are often so deplorable that judges feel compelled to order
sweeping changes in prison operation. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318
(M.D. Ala. 1976); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304
(8th Cir. 1971). For case studies of the abuse prisoners undergo, see Hirschkop &
Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REv. 795, 795-812 (1969).
The area of free speech has been no exception. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d
632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961) (prison administrator prevented inmate
from obtaining legal materials from relatives or friends); Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986
(9th Cir. 1948) (prison authorities confiscated the first lesson sheet in a correspondence
course which they had encouraged the inmate to take); Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 783 (1944) (prison authorities prevented inmate from securing
Bible study aids circulated by a religious group); Fussa v. Taylor, 168 F. Supp. 302 (M.D.
Pa. 1958) (prison official prevented inmate from corresponding with his common law wife
because official believed their relationship was not constructive). Fox, supra note 64, at
176 n. 134 listed publications that had been banned by New York State prisons as reported
by the N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1971, § 7. at 47:
"The Jefferson Bible," The Blackstone Law Course, Psychology Today, Nation-
al Geographic, newsletters of the Mattachine and Fortune Societies, Koestler's
"The Ghost Machine," Gay's "The Enlightenment," Ferkiss' "Technological
Man," Kaslow's "The Changeless Order," Carlson's "Modern Biology," Mat-
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trary deprivations of prisoners' rights have a critical impact on the
rehabilitative process. 96 Unnecessary restrictions increase prisoners' sus-
picions about authority figures97 and lower inmates' self-respect. 98 The
prison environment is especially dehumanizing, and any unnecessary
restraint upon an inmate's freedom of speech will be more deleterious to
his self-image than if the same restriction were placed upon a free
citizen. 9 Because unnecessary limitations on prisoners' rights will make
inmates' adjustment more difficult when they re-enter society," ° in-
creased crime and high recidivism rates probably will ensue. 101
Although the Court found the regulations unnecessarily restrictive, it
may have based its decision on the rights of outsiders and limited the
holding to direct personal correspondence because it was not ready to
commit itself on the quantum of first amendment speech rights an inmate
retains." 2 The Court may also have wanted to leave a means of retreat if
son's "Being, Becoming and Behavior," Levitas' "Culture and Consciousness,"
Erikson's "Youth and Crisis," Levi-Strauss' "The Savage Mind," Von Ber-
talanffy's "Robots, Men and Minds," Moorehead's "The Fatal Impact," Fried-
man's "To Deny Our Nothingness," Jung's "Man and His Symbols," McLu-
han's "Understanding Media," Lunger's "Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling,"
Bettelheim's "The Empty Fortress," Lewis's "La Vida," Silberman's "Crisis in
Black and White," Edwards' "The Rage of India," Sinclair's "The Cry for
Justice," and Zaidenberg's "The Emotional Self."
96. See H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 359 (3d ed. 1959);
UNITED STATES PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 83 (1967); Barkin, The Emergence of
Correctional Law and the Awareness of the Rights of the Convicted, 45 NEB. L. REv. 669,
671 (1966); Hirschkop & Millemann, supra note 95, at 824; Note, Decency and Fairness:
An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REv. 841, 864 (1971).
97. See Note, supra note 96, at 864.
98. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 428 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
99. Id.
100. See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
101. See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
102. This seems likely because the Court declined to address these issues although it
expressed a desire to establish a uniform standard of review for prison mail regulations:
This array of disparate approaches and the absence of any generally accepted
standard for testing the constitutionality of prisoner mail censorship regulations
disserve both the competing interests at stake. On the one hand, the First
Amendment interests implicated by censorship of inmate correspondence are
given only haphazard and inconsistent protection. On the other, the uncertainty
of the constitutional standard makes it impossible for correctional officials to
anticipate what is required of them and invites repetitive, piecemeal litigation on
behalf of inmates. The result has been unnecessarily to perpetuate the involve-
ment of the federal courts in affairs of prison administration. Our task is to
formulate a standard of review for prisoner mail censorship that will be respon-
sive to these concerns.
416 U.S. at 407.
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it became disenchanted with the decision's effect on the prison system or
with the lower courts' interpretation of the case.
Despite the majority's failure to ground the decision on prisoners' rights,
Martinez protects the inmates' interest in nearly every instance in which
direct personal cbrrespondence is at issue. An outsider will be involved
except on the rare occasion when a prisoner wishes to communicate with
an inmate in another penal institution. 113
Although the Court did not address prisoners' rights or mass mailings,
it contributed greatly to the analysis of free speech rights in the prison
context. It recognized the need to develop a standard designed for the
unique problems posed by the prison environment.I°4 To create such a
standard the Court relied heavily upon the O'Brien test. 15 The Martinez
standard left the first prong of the O'Brien test substantially intact, but
added that in the prison environment the important governmental inter-
ests were the rehabilitation of inmates and the security and internal order
in prison. 106 The second prong of the Martinez test differed, however,
103. When interprison communication between inmates is at issue, lower federal
courts have upheld restrictions even when there was no showing that the restriction was
necessary. See, e.g., Peterson v. Davis, 415 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Va. 1976); Mitchell v.
Carlson, 404 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Kan. 1975); Lawrence v. Davis, 401 F. Supp. 1203 (W.D.
Va. 1975).
104. 416 U.S. at 412.
105. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text. Martinez also relied on Healy v.
James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), and Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
In Healy, a college president refused to recognize a local chapter of the Students for a
Democratic Society as a campus organization. Denial of recognition meant the organiza-
tion could not use campus facilities for meetings or the campus bulletin board. The Court
held the president could justifiably refuse to recognize the organization if there were
evidence to support the conclusion that it "posed a substantive threat of material disrup-
tion" but the first amendment right could not be limited if the fear of disruptive activities
was unsubstantiated. 408 U.S. at 189.
In Tinker, school officials prevented students from wearing black armbands to protest
the Vietnam war. The Supreme Court held that this conduct was closely related to "pure
speech" and therefore the school officials had the burden of showing that the wearing of
the armbands would substantially interfere with the governmental interest in maintaining
discipline in the school. The Court carefully examined the requirements of orderly school
administration to ensure that the officials impinged on the students' free speech rights no
more than necessary "in light of the special characteristics of the. . . environment." 393
U.S. at 506.
106. Applying the teachings of our prior decisions to the instant context, we hold
that censorship of prisoner mail is justified if the following criteria are met. First,
the regulation or practice in question must further an important or substantial
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Prison officials
may not censor inmate correspondence simply to eliminate unflattering or unwel-
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from its counterpart in O'Brien. It mandated that the means used be
I generally necessary" to the furtherance of security, order, and rehabili-
tation.1 07
The Court's recognition of the importance of the rehabilitative process
in prison reform 08 and its implicit rejection of retribution represents a
progressive attitude toward prison affairs. °9 Martinez intended that
rehabilitation be balanced against the necessity for prison security and
order. 110 Specifically, the Court recognized that personal correspondence
furthers, rather than impedes rehabilitation.'11
The importance of the assertion that deprivations of outsiders' rights
must be "generally necessary," 1 2 rather than essential, cannot be under-
come opinions or factually inaccurate statements. Rather, they must show that a
regulation authorizing mail censorship furthers one or more of the substantial
governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation.
416 U.S. at 413.
107. Second, the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than
is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest
involved. Thus a restriction on inmate correspondence that furthers an important
or substantial interest of penal administration will nevertheless be invalid if its
sweep is unnecessarily broad. This does not mean, of course, that prison adminis-
trators may be required to show with certainty that adverse consequences would
flow from the failure to censor a particular letter. Some latitude in anticipating the
probable consequences of allowing certain speech in a prison environment is
essential to the proper discharge of an administrator's duty. But any regulation or
practice that restricts inmate correspondence must be generally necessary to
protect one or more of the legitimate governmental interests identified above.
Id. at 413-14.
108. Id. at 412-13. See AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORREC-
TION STANDARDS 10 (3d ed. 1966): "Penologists in the United States today are generally
agreed that the prison serves most effectively for the protection of society against crime
when its major emphasis is on rehabilitation. They accept this as a fact that no longer
needs to be debated." For a discussion of the importance of prisoner rehabilitation to
society at large, see Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 64 at 208-15; Turner, Establishing the
Rule of Law in Prisons: A ManualforPrisoners'Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REv. 473,
473-74 (1971).
109. Rehabilitation and retribution are mutually exclusive goals. To rehabilitate, a
program of individualized treatment should be instituted to afford the prisoner the oppor-
tunity to further his education and develop his vocational talents. This is necessary for the
inmate's adjustment to society upon release. If retribution were a goal, however, prison-
ers would never receive this treatment. Because the basis of this theory is that a prisoner
should pay for his crime, the expenditure of funds and effort on the part of prison
administrators necessary for treatment could not be justified. For a discussion of retribu-
tion, see Beyond the Ken, supra note 64, at 516-18.
110. 416 U.S. at 412-13.
111. Id. at 412.
112. Id. at 414.
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stated." 3 This "generally necessary" language represents the Supreme
Court's recognition that it had to balance significant competing interests.
Prison officials must retain a modicum of discretion to function effective-
ly. 114 On the other hand, the Court recognized its duty to protect non-
prisoners' free speech rights." 5
D. Pell v. Procunier
The Supreme Court decided Pell v. Procunier116 shortly after Mar-
tinez 17 but took a different approach." 8 Inmates and journalists chal-
lenged a prison regulation 19 that banned face-to-face interviews between
members of the press and prisoners with whom they had specifically
requested an interview.120 The inmates asserted the regulation violated
their right to free speech, 12 whereas the newsmen claimed it infringed
the freedom of the press. 122 The Court rejected both contentions and
upheld the regulation.'23
113. The Court did not explicitly reject "essential" as the governing standard. Indeed,
it was cited with approval. Nevertheless, the subsequent discussion of the latitude prison
officials should be accorded seems to indicate that the Court would permit prison officials
to act when it was generally necessary and not essential.
114. 416 U.S. at 414 ("Some latitude in anticipating the probable consequences of
allowing certain speech in a prison environment is essential to the proper discharge of an
administrator's duty.").
115. Id. at 408.
116. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
117. The Court decided Martinez on April 29, 1974, and Pell on June 24, 1974. The
Court handed down Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974), the same day as
Pell. In Saxbe, the Washington Post challenged the visitation policy of the Federal Bureau
of Prisons that banned face-to-face interviews between inmates and newsmen. The Court,
however, upheld the regulations. For a discussion of Saxbe, see 60 CORNELL L. REV. 446
(1975).
118. For a discussion of Pell, see The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV.
41, 165 (1974); Note, The Public's Right to Know: Pell v. Procunier and Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 829 (1975); Note, supra note 84; Com-
ment, The Right of the Press to Gather Information After Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA.
L. REV. 166 (1975); Comment, Bans on Interviews of Prisoners: Prisoner and Press Rights
After Pell and Saxbe, 9 U.S.F. L. REV. 718 (1975); 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 913 (1974).
119. California Department of Corrections Manual § 415.071 provides: "Press and
other media interviews with specific individual inmates will not be permitted." Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. at 819.
120. In Hillery v. Procunier, 364 F. Supp. 196 (N.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd in part sub nom.
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), a three-judge district court held that the regulation
was a violation of inmates' first amendment rights but not of journalists' rights.
121. 417 U.S. at 820-21.
122. Id. at 821. Specifically, they contend their right to gather news was violated. See,
e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) ("[W]ithout some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.").
123. 417 U.S. at 835.
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Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, conceded that face-to-face
interviews were inherently different from other modes of expression.1 24
Nevertheless, he believed an inquiry into the alternative means of com-
munication was relevant. 25 The availability of alternative means of
expression would not ordinarily justify a limitation on first amendment
speech rights, but, because the "internal problems of state prisons
involve issues . . .peculiarly within state authority and expertise," it
was an important consideration in the prison context. 26 Visits with
family, friends, lawyers, and clergymen, as well as virtually unlimited
correspondence, sufficiently protected the inmates' interest in communi-
cation. 127
The Court noted that "the pattern of [a place's] normal activities
dictates" whether regulations are permissible 128 and, because there are
many dangerous people in prisons, security is a primary concern.1 29
Yet concern for security did not warrant a blanket prohibition of prison-
ers' free speech rights. 3 Because a determination of what best promotes
security, order, and rehabilitation is "peculiarly within the province and
professional expertise of correction officials," 1 31 the Court invested them
with broad discretion. 32 Rather than require officials to bear the burden
of proof, officials could use their discretion unless there was "substantial
evidence in the record" to show that their response to the potential threat
to prison security was exaggerated. 3 3 The Court failed to consider
whether a less restrictive alternative was available.
Although outsiders' rights were also infringed, the Pell majority up-
held the regulation because the press, as well as the general public, could
"observe prison conditions" even without face-to-face interviews with
specifically designated inmates by touring the correctional facilities. 13 4
Members of the press also had "general access to all parts of the
124. Id. at 823.
125. Id. at 824.
126. Id. at 825-26.
127. Id. at 824-25. The friends had to be "long-standing." Id. at 825 n.4.
128. Id. at 826.
129. Id. at 826-27.
130. Id. at 827.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 830.
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institutions." 135 The Court observed that reporters had no greater right to
information than the general public. 136
Justice Douglas' cogent dissent conceded that certain limitations on
prisoners' first amendment rights may be essential to maintain security
and order. 137 He emphasized, however, that the restrictions must be
precisely drawn to avoid unnecessary infringement of a fundamental
right.138 Furthermore, an unduly restrictive regulation cannot be justified
by establishing that there are other available means of communication. 139
He concluded that the absolute ban on newsmen interviews with inmates
whom they had specifically requested to interview was unnecessary to
preserve prison security and order. Therefore, the regulation was unjusti-
fiable even though an inmate could correspond with newsmen, and
family, friends, attorneys, and clergymen could visit with prisoners."4°
In Pell, the Court did not employ a traditional first amendment analy-
sis. Inmates had recently made an escape attempt that resulted in five
deaths,' 41 and prison authorities attributed it in part to the prison policy
that allowed newsmen to conduct face-to-face interviews with inmates. 142
Thus, the Court may justifiably have been wary of limiting prison
officials' discretion in matters of prison security and order. Nonetheless,
it seems anomalous to reject the Martinez analysis so soon after it was
decided. Although visitation rights may pose a greater threat to prison
security than does personal correspondence, 43 there is no need to alter
135. Id. They could also interview inmates whom the prison authorities randomly
chose.
136. Id. at 833-34 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,684-85 (1972)).The Court
recently heard argument in a case involving the media's right of access to prisons vis-h-vis
that of the general public. KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 546 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
granted, 431 U.S. 928 (1977).
137. Id. at 837-38.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. On August 21, 1971, three prison officials and two inmates died during an escape
attempt at San Quentin, the jail in which the inmate petitioners were confined. Hillery v.
Procunier, 364 F. Supp. 196, 198 (N.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd in part sub nom. Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
142. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 831; Hillery v. Procunier, 364 F. Supp. at 198.
Consequently, they promulgated the regulations in question. 417 U.S. at 831; 364 F. Supp.
at 198.
143. In Procunier v. Martinez ...we could find no legitimate governmental
interest to justify the substantial restrictions that had there been imposed on
written communication by inmates. When, however, the question involves the
entry of people into the prisons for face-to-face communication with inmates, it is
obvious that institutional considerations, such as security and related administra-
tive problems, as well as the accepted and legitimate policy objectives of the
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the analytical framework. Because the balancing test employed in Mar-
tinez will be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the...
environment,'"'" officials will be able to react to actual threats to
security and order. Martinez stated that these concerns were important 4 5
and afforded prison officials more leeway than other governmental offi-
cers by creating the "generally necessary" test."
Although prison administration is difficult' 47 and prison officials have
expertise, 48 shifting the burden of proof from the officials to the inmate
or nonprisoner whose right is allegedly infringed is unnecessary. The
complexities of prison administration do not justify analyzing the visita-
tion policy in light of alternative means of communications rather than by
determining whether the ban is "generally necessary" for the mainte-
nance of prison security and order. Administration of schools, for exam-
ple, is complex and requires expertise, yet courts apply the traditional
balancing test. 4 9 Since judges may rely on expert testimony when their
background in a particular field is inadequate, courts should not abdicate
their duty to protect constitutional rights solely because they lack exper-
tise in an area. Indeed, the primary responsibility of a federal judge is to
uphold the Constitution, 150 and without judicial intervention, fundamen-
tal freedoms would be inadequately protected. 5'
corrections system itself, require that some limitation be placed on such visita-
tions.
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 826. See notes 167-69 infra and accompanying text.
144. 416 U.S. at 409-10 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. at 506).
145. 416 U.S. at 412.
146. See notes 112-15 supra and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 404-05: "The Herculean obstacles to
effective discharge of [a prison administrator's] duties are too apparent to warrant explica-
tion. Suffice it to say that the problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable
148. See, e.g., Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1970): "We
further recognize that the administrators of the state prison unquestionably possess vast
experience, which we do not, upon which to base their regulations and practice in the
handling of prisoners consigned to their custody."
149. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
150. See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967); Johnson, The Constitution
and the Federal District Judge, 54 TEx. L. REv. 903 (1976).
The cornerstone of our American legal system rests on recognition of the
Constitution as the supreme law of the land, and the paramount duty of the
federal judiciary is to uphold that law. Thus, when a state fails to meet constitu-
tionally mandated requirements, it is the solemn duty of the courts to assure
compliance with the Constitution.
Id. at 914-15.
151. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
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Because courts perform the sentencing function, they have an addi-
tional reason for intervening in prison affairs. In determining appropriate
sentences, judges consider the needs of both society and the convicted
defendant. Accordingly, they should be able to ensure that the inmate's
treatment is consistent with the purpose of the sentence.152
In addition, prison administrators cannot properly balance the inmate's
free speech interests against the need for security and order.' 53 Because
their primary concern is the maintenance of order, as long as there is no
turbulence, public criticism will be minimal, and their jobs will be
secure.' 5 4 More generally, administrators have developed an area of
expertise which may produce a parochial viewpoint.' 55 Judges, on the
other hand, have a broader perspective: 56 they seek to protect the
"enduring values of. . . society."' 57 Moreover, because federal judges
have life tenure, 158 they can do what they think is just with little concern
for its popularity.159
Similarly, the Pell Court's argument that state prisons are under the
aegis of state governments and therefore the federal judiciary should not
intervene is unpersuasive when constitutional rights are at issue. 160 Al-
though federalism and principles of comity limit the federal courts'
152. See Fox, supra note 64, at 164; Comment, Confronting the Conditions of Confine-
ment: An Expanded Role for Courts in Pison Reform, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 367,
387 (1977).
153. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2532, 2546
(1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 327 (1965);
Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process, "83 HARv. L. REv. 518, 523 (1970).
156. L. JAFFE, supra note 155, at 327; Monaghan, supra note 155, at 523.
157. Monaghan, supra note 155, at 523-24 (quoting A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 25-26 (1961)); see L. JAFFE, supa note 155, at 327.
158. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I provides: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour ....
159. On the other hand, members of the executive and legislative branches, as well as
state judges, must weigh the political ramifications of their actions.
160. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405-06: "But a policy of judicial restraint
cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether
arising in a federal or state institution. When a prison regulation or practice offends a
fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect
constitutional rights." (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969)).
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involvement in state affairs, 161 they should not hesitate to intervene when
constitutional rights are infringed. 62
Finally, the Supreme Court's refusal to extend the Martinez standard
to interview requests added to the existing confusion surrounding free
speech rights in the prison environment. Federal judges had to decide
whether to apply Martinez or Pell when prisoners' receipt of publica-
tions was at issue, without direction from the Court.
E. Lower Federal Courts' Handling of Publications Issue
Outsiders, as well as prisoners, may have a greater interest in personal
correspondence than in visitation rights with newsmen or publication
rights. There is certainly a greater interest when the correspondence is
between family members. 163 Courts could have seized upon this to
distinguish Martinez and apply the Pell standard when the right to
publications was at issue, but instead most relied on the Martinez test.164
These courts may have recognized that publications present less of a
security risk than personal correspondence because, in contrast to the
personal message in correspondence, publications are available to the
general public.165 Regulations governing incoming publications should
therefore be less stringent than those for personal correspondence; 166
161. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
162. See note 160 supra and accompanying text.
163. See Joint Committee on the Legal Status of Prisoners, Tentative Draft of Stan-
dards Relating to the Legal Status of Prsoners, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 377, 505 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Legal Status of Prisoners]: "Perhaps there is no more important
rehabilitative charge in prison than not to unduly disrupt the familial relationship, which
offers the main support to the prisoner both during incarceration and after release."
164. See, e.g., Carpenter v. South Dakota, 536 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1976); Aikens v.
Jenkins, 534 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1976); Morgan v. LaVallee, 526 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1975);
Gaugh v. Schmidt, 498 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Hopkins v. Collins, 411 F.
Supp. 831 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd in pertinent part, 548 F.2d 503 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam);
Cofone v. Manson, 409 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Conn. 1976); The Luparar v. Stoneman, 382 F.
Supp. 495 (D. Vt. 1974), appeal dismissed mem., 517 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1975); Frazier v.
Donelon, 381 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd mem., 520 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 923 (1976); McCleary v. Kelly, 376 F. Supp. 1186 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Gray
v. Creamer, 376 F. Supp. 675 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D.
Okla. 1974). Contra, Paka v. Manson, 387 F. Supp. 111 (D. Conn. 1974).
165. Cofone v. Manson, 409 F. Supp. 1033, 1039 (D. Conn. 1976).
166. The United States Bureau of Prisons apparently agreed; it imposed less stringent
regulations upon incoming publications than upon personal correspondence.
Policy Statement 7300. IA. . . specifies that personal correspondence of inmates
in federal prisons, whether incoming or outgoing, may be rejected for inclusion of
the following kinds of material:
(1) Any material which might violate postal regulations, i.e., threats, black-
mail, contraband or which indicate plots of escape.
(2) Discussions of criminal activities.Washington University Open Scholarship
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thus, the vast discretionary power that Pell vested in prison authorities
would be unwarranted.
Visits, on the other hand, pose a greater threat to prison security and
order than either personal correspondence or publications1 67 because the
means of communication is so intimate. 6 ' Moreover, an inmate could
(3) No inmate may be permitted to direct his business while he is in confine-
ment. This does not go to the point of prohibiting correspondence necessary to
enable the inmate to protect the property and funds that were legitimately his at
the time he was committed to the institution. Thus, an inmate could correspond
about refinancing a mortgage on his home or sign insurance papers, but he could
not operate a mortgage or insurance business while in the institution.
(4) Letters containing codes or other obvious attempts to circumvent these
regulations will be subject to rejection.
(5) Insofar as possible, all letters should be written in English, but every
effort should be made to accommodate those inmates who are unable to write in
English or whose correspondents would be unable to understand a letter written
in English. The criminal sophistication of the inmate, the relationship of the
inmate and the correspondent are factors to be considered in deciding whether
correspondence in a foreign language should be permitted.
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 414 n.14 (quoting Policy Statement 7300.IA of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons). Policy Statement 7300.42B(4), which controls incoming
publications, is as follows:
a. Publications, including books, must come directly from the publisher.
Executive officers of the following institutions may authorize exceptions to this
rule: Morgantown, Englewood, Pleasanton, Ashland, Seagoville, Allenwood,
Eglin, Montgomery, Safford and the Lompoc Camp.
b. Unless a publication will be detrimental to the security, good order and
discipline of the institution, it will not be barred from admittance to the institu-
tion.
c. Prior approval will not be necessary for an inmate to subscribe to a
publication. However, if upon examination of three issues, not necessarily suc-
cessive, it is determined that a publication is unacceptable, it may be prohibited
from the institution on the basis of paragraph 4b above. It is expected, however,
that a further review of such publication should be initiated six months subse-
quent to the date the publication was originally or previously barred.
d. Caution will be exercised before declaring a publication unacceptable
because of its religious, philosophical, social or sexual views. As indicated in 4b,
above, the decision not to forward a publication to an inmate under this Policy
Statement must be based on a showing that doing so will clearly compromise the
security, discipline and good order of the institution.
e. Where a publication is unacceptable under this Policy Statement, the head
of the institution shall make a complete record of the reasons for finding the
publication unacceptable. The head of the institution will notify the publisher by
letter (I) that a particular publication is unacceptable and will not be delivered to
the inmate addressee, (2) the reason the publication is being rejected, and (3) that
he may obtain an independent review of the rejection by writing to the Regional
Director within fifteen (15) days of the letter. The inmate addressee will be
advised of the rejection by a copy of the letter to the publisher.
f. A reasonable limit shall be placed on the number of publications an indi-
vidual may retain in quarters.
Cofone v. Manson, 409 F. Supp. at 1039 n. 14 (quoting Policy Statement 7300.42B(4) of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons).
167. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 826.
168. Pell did not articulate why visits in general are dangerous to prison security and
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become a prison celebrity because of visits from the press and wield
power among fellow inmates. 169 Thus, although the Martinez standard is
sufficiently flexible to encompass both situations, it is arguable that
prison officials need more discretion to limit visits than is permitted
under Martinez.
Although the lower federal courts have invoked Martinez, 70 most
have failed to apply it properly. 17' They unnecessarily restricted non-
prisoners' rights to send publications as well as prisoners' rights to
receive them. In Gray v. Creamer"2 and McCleary v. Kelly,'173 two
Pennsylvania district courts scrutinized regulations promulgated by the
Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction. 74 Although both courts invoked
order. Legal Status of Prisoners, supra note 163, at 503, says the obvious reason is that the
visitor may sneak in contraband.
169. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 831-32; Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375, 1383
(D. Conn. 1971).
170. See note 164 supra and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Carpenter v. South Dakota, 536 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1976); Frazier v.
Donelon, 381 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd mem. 520 F.2d 941, (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 923 (1976); McCleary v. Kelly, 376 F. Supp. 1186 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Gray
v. Creamer, 376 F. Supp. 675 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
172. 376 F. Supp. 675 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
173. 376 F. Supp. 1186 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
174. The Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction's regulations governing incoming publica-
tions provided:
I. PURPOSE
It is the policy of the Bureau of Correction to give wide latitude to residents
in selecting publications and subscribing to periodicals in order that educa-
tional, cultural, informational, religious, legal and philosophical needs of
individuals will be satisfied. It is the purpose of this directive to establish
procedures regarding incoming publications which shall be applicable to all
institutions in the Bureau of Correction.
II. SCOPE
The procedures outlined in this directive shall cover the purchase and/or
receipt of all outside publications including legal publications, fiction and
non-fiction books, paper backs, correspondence courses, training manuals,
reference materials, magazines, newspapers, religious tracts and
pamphlets.
III. GENERAL PROCEDURES
A. All publications shall be mailed directly from the original source,
publisher, magazine distributor, department store or book store with
the exception of small letter-size religious tracts and pamphlets which
may be received in regular correspondence from family, friends or
religious advisor.
B. An institutional staff committee of treatment and custodial representa-
tives appointed by the Superintendent shall be responsible for clearing
resident requests for outside publications and for reviewing publica-
tions received.
C. All decisions with respect to the approval or disapproval of outside
publications shall be based on the criteria of Paragraph IV. below.
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Martinez, 75 they upheld regulations that clearly conflicted with the
Martinez policy and standard.
The policy statement in the Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction's Regu-
lations indicated that prisoners were allowed to receive publications that
would fulfill their "educational, cultural, informational, religious, legal,
and philosophical" needs. 176 The Bureau evidently envisioned itself
benevolently granting inmates the privilege of exposure to and communi-
cation with the outside world and, by implication, thought outsiders had
no first amendment free speech rights in the prison context. As Martinez
pointed out, however, the sending of publications by nonprisoners is a
right, not a mere privilege. 177
The Pennsylvania regulations at issue in Gray and McCleary were not
"generally necessary ' 1 78 to the advancement of security, order, or re-
habilitation. 79 For example, the Bureau of Correction unnecessarily
D. Residents shall have the right to appeal to the Superintendent any staff
committee decision disapproving a publication.
E. Should the Superintendent concur with the staff committee's disap-
proval, a resident may appeal to the Commissioner of Correction who
shall evaluate the publication in conjunction with the Office of the
Attorney General. The findings shall be communicated to all institu-
tions.
IV. CRITERIA
A. Requests for and receipt of publications shall be disapproved when the
publications contain the following:
1. Information regarding the manufacture of explosives, incendiaries,
weapons or escape devices.
2. Instructions regarding the ingredients and/or manufacture of
poisons or drugs.
3. Clearly inflammatory writings advocating violence, insurrection or
guerrilla warfare against the government or any of its institutions.
4. Judicially defined obscenity.
B. No legitimate publication shall be prohibited solely on the basis that
such publication is critical of penal institutions in general, of a particu-
lar institution, of a particular institutional staff member, or an official
of the Bureau of Correction or of a correctional or penological practice
in this or in any other jurisdiction.
C. The above criteria should not be interpreted so broadly as to affect
recognized textbooks in chemistry, physics or the social sciences.
Gray v. Creamer, 376 F. Supp. at 682-83 app.
175. McCleary v. Kelly, 376 F. Supp. 1186, 1190-92 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Gray v. Creamer,
376 F. Supp. 675, 677-78 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
176. See note 174 supra.
177. 416 U,S. at 408.
178. Id. at 414 ("[A]ny regulation or practice that restricts inmate correspondence
must be generally necessary to protect one or more of the legitimate governmental
interests identified above.").
179. Id. at 413 (Here, Martinez articulated security, order, and rehabilitation as the
three substantial governmental interests in the prison context.).
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prohibited family or friends from mailing publications to a prisoner. 180
Although family or friends might attempt to smuggle contraband within
the pages of a publication or within a hollowed book, officials could
maintain security by inspecting incoming publications.18' Prison au-
thorities should not abrogate first amendment rights merely to further
administrative convenience. 182
The regulations adopted by the Bureau of Correction failed to comply
with Martinez in yet another way. They stipulated that although "recog-
nized textbooks" might fall within the classification of publications
subject to prohibition, prison authorities could not ban them. 183 This
exemption of "recognized textbooks" demonstrates that the Bureau's
primary concern was with the merit of the publication and not with the
work's probable impact upon the inmates and their environment. Under
the Pennsylvania regulations the nonprisoner's right to send publications
hinged upon the subjective and personal opinion of prison authorities
about the work's moral and educational value. Martinez, however, by
stating that security, order, or rehabilitation must be furthered to justify a
restraint on first amendment free speech rights, focused upon the publica-
tion's probable effect within the prison.' 84 Martinez sought to eliminate
the subjective and arbitrary infringements of first amendment rights
which the Pennsylvania regulations sanctioned.18
The Gray Court stated that the Bureau of Correction's Regulations
comported with Martinez because the prison administration did not
"seek to unnecessarily hamper freedom of expression" when promulgat-
ing the regulations. 186 Thus, if prison authorities unintentionally infring-
ed outsider's first amendment rights, the regulations would be valid.
Martinez, however, rejected prison authorities' intent as a criterion for
180. See note 174 supra.
181. Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), finding aff'd, 507 F.2d
333 (2d Cir. 1974).
182. Id. Martinez implicitly rejected administrative convenience as a justification for
deprivation of first amendment rights by not citing it as one of the three legitimate
governmental interests in the prison context. In other settings, the Court has held that
administrative convenience does not justify infringing a fundamental right. See, e.g.,
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (equal protection claim); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) (due process claim).
183. See note 174 supra.
184. Martinez clearly rejected prison officials' personal opinions regarding a publica-
tion's quality as a criteron for limiting first amendment rights. 416 U.S. at 415.
185. Id. at 407.
186. 376 F. Supp. at 678 (emphasis added).
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judging the legitimacy of their conduct. 8 7 Accepting prison officials'
"good faith" as a justification for their actions would dilute Martinez188
and lead to frequent abuse of outsiders' and inmates' fundamental
rights. 189
Courts have also applied Martinez when testing the constitutionality of
regulations that ban sexually explicit publications. 190 In Frazier v. Done-
Ion, 191 prison officials rejected sexually explicit publications on the
ground that they tended to disrupt prison order."9 They added that these
publications "constitute valuable contraband within the prison culture
and consequently possession of these items frequently becomes a source
of inmate competition and agitation."'' 93
The Donelon court upheld the ban on sexually explicit publications,
determining that a prisoner's right to such publications bordered on
frivolity.1 94 If the court had given the publications the presumption of
acceptability mandated by Martinez, it may have reached a different
result. Indeed, the official justification for the ban-that such publica-
tions constituted valuable contraband which would cause agitation within
the prison-is arguably a compelling reason for permitting prisoners to
187. Martinez mandated that courts review the constitutionality of a prison official's
action on the basis of its effect on security, order, and rehabilitation. 416 U.S. at 413.
188. It is much easier to demonstrate that someone violated another's rights than to
show that the infringement was intentional. See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack,
508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (suit brought under Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)):
Effect, and not motivation, is the touchstone, in part because clever men may
easily conceal their motivations, but more importantly, because * * * [w]hatever
our law was once, * * * we now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of
thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public
interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.
Id. at 1185. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205 (1970) states: "The function of proof of motivation in cases where it is
relevant will be to create a burden of legitimate defense which otherwise would not be
owing." Id at 1208.
189. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Carpenter v. South Dakota, 536 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1976); Aikens v.
Jenkins, 534 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1976); Frazier v. Donelon, 381 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. La.
1974), aff'd mem., 520 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 923 (1976).
191. 381 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd mem., 520 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 923 (1976).
192. 381 F. Supp. at 916.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 919.
195. Because Martinez established there was a right to correspond, the burden of proof
would be on the party seeking to limit this right.
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obtain sexually explicit publications. If such publications were readily
available, the alleged competition and agitation would cease.196
The prison officials' naked assertion that the publications would inter-
fere with prison order' 97 was insufficient to justify banning these
publications. Although the Martinez test may not require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the prohibition of sexually explicit publications
would further security, order, or rehabilitation, 198 it properly requires
more than a mere assertion.199 There is tremendous sexual tension in
prison, 2" but it does not follow a fortiorari that sexually explicit publica-
tions aggravate this tension.20 1 Homosexual rape is a major problem in
prisons, 20 2 but authorities have determined that rape is an expression of
aggression rather than a function of sexual deprivation.20 3 It is therefore
possible that sexually explicit publications, rather than leading to sexual
deviance, could provide a much needed outlet for inmates' pent-up
frustrations .204
Although many courts have invoked and misapplied Martinez,2 5 at
196. This Note assumes the validity of the prison officials' statement that the competi-
tion and agitation was a consequence of the publications being contraband. 381 F. Supp. at
916.
197. Id.
198. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 3%, 414 (1974).
199. Id. at 415-16.
200. See, e.g., D. CLEMMER, THE PRISON COMMUNITY 257-73 (1958); G. SYKES, THE
SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES 70-72 (1958); Hirschkop & Millemann, supra note 95, at 814-15;
Note, supra note %, at 858-59.
201. For a discussion of the effects of sexually explicit publications, see P. GEBHARD,
J. GAGNON, W. POMEROY, & C. CHRISTENSON, SEX OFFENDERS 670 (1965) ("[R]ather
large proportions of the men reported little or no sexual arousal from pornography.");
THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY (1970), quoted in L.
SUNDERLAND, OBSCENITY: THE COURT, THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION 74 (1974): "'[E]xtensive empirical investigation, both by the Commission and by
others, provides no evidence that exposure to or use of explicit sexual materials play a
significant role in the causation of social or individual harms such as crime, delinquency,
sexual or non-sexual deviancy or severe emotional disturbances .... ' "; Cairnes, Paul,
& Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumption of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical
Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1009, 1035-36 (1962).
202. See note 200 supra.
203. S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 267 (1975); A. MEDEA & K. THOMPSON,
AGAINST RAPE 32 (1974); Griffin, Rape: The All-American Crime, RAMPARTS 26,35 (Sept.
1971).
204. See Cairnes, Paul, & Wishner, supra note 201, at 1036 ("[I]t may be that with
some of these people, obscenity operates as a safety valve for release of feelings.").
205. See Carpenter v. South Dakota, 536 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1976); Frazier v. Donelon,
381 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd mem., 520 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
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least one has properly applied it. In Cofone v. Manson,20 6 the federal
district court in Connecticut invalidated regulations that permitted prison
officials to reject publications if they " 'advocate disruption within
institutions or in the community; have demonstrably caused disruption
within the institutions or in the community; . . . [or] obstruct rehabilita-
tive objectives.' -207
The regulations allowed prison officials to ban publications even
though they did not threaten the security or order of the prison. Indeed,
the use of the word "disruption" as a criterion for banning publications
could conceivably lead to the infringement of inmates' and outsiders'
rights because their activity merely displeased officials."' The draftsmen
of the regulations also failed to realize that first amendment guarantees
must be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the . . .
environment.' 209 Officials may justifiably ban a publication that poses
an actual threat to the security and order of the prison, but if the threat is
to the security and order of the outside community, there must be a
"clear and present danger" that criminal activity will occur. 210 The
Cofone court found the regulation permitting prison officials to reject a
publication that "obstructed rehabilitative objectives" the least palat-
able.211 This catch-all provision in effect granted the officials discretion
to reject any publication.
F. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.
In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. ,212 the
Supreme Court failed to follow the Cofone approach. A three-judge
district court addressed the issue of whether prison officials could prevent
a union from mailing literature to inmates in bulk.213 Noting that other
424 U.S. 923 (1976); McCleary v. Kelly, 376 F. Supp. 1186 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Gray v.
Creamer, 376 F. Supp. 675 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
206. 409 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Conn. 1976).
207. Id. at 1040 (quoting Connecticut Department of Correction, Administrative Direc-
tive, Review of Reading Materials, ch. 3.7, § 4).
208. Id.
209. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
210. Cofone v. Manson, 409 F. Supp. at 1040 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969)).
211. Id. at 1041.
212. 97 S. Ct. 2532 (1977).
213. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. v. Jones, 409 F. Supp. 937
(E.D.N.C. 1976), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2532 (1977). The district court and Supreme Court also
discussed prisoners' first amendment associational rights.
[Vol. 1977:649
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss4/5
PRISONERS' FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
groups were accorded these privileges, 214 and finding no evidence that
the union threatened the institution's security or order, 215 the court held
that equal protection principles mandated that officials allow the union to
send its literature in bulk to selected inmates.21 6
The Supreme Court reversed, employing a mode of analysis that may
prove to be a great setback for prisoners' and nonprisoners' first amend-
ment rights. While laying the groundwork for the majority, Justice
Rehnquist set the tone of the opinion. He stated that prison officials
should be accorded "wide-ranging deference" because of lack of judicial
expertise in the complicated area of prison administration. 217 He cited
federalism and notions of comity as additional reasons for deferring to
prison authorities.218
As evidence of the adverse effect the union would have on the prison
environment, he quoted statements of prominent Department of Correc-
tion officials. 219 Although the Court acknowledged the district court's
finding that there was " 'not one scintilla of evidence to suggest that the
Union has been utilized to disrupt the operation of the penal institu-
tions,' ",220 it noted that the district court failed to demonstrate that the
prison officials' fears were "groundless.' '221
The Court did not require the prison officials to show that the union
was dangerous to security. Rather, it relied on Pell to establish that
inmates or outsiders must demonstrate that the officials' beliefs were
unreasonable.222 Indeed, the Court upheld the officials' action because
"they have not been conclusively shown to be wrong.'"23 The Court also
explained why the regulations were reasonable. Only bulk mailings were
involved and thus first amendment speech rights of both prisoners and
outsiders were "barely implicated. ' 224 The union could send publica-
tions piecemeal to each prisoner2 s and, although union solicitation and
214. Id. at 944.
215. Id. at 945.
216. Id. The Court did not specify whether its determination was based on strict
scrutiny or mere rationality.
217. 97 S. Ct. at 2538.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 2539.
220. Id. at 2539 n.5 (quoting 409 F. Supp. at 944).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 2539.
223. Id. at 2542.
224. Id. at 2540.
225. Id. at 2541 n.8.
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organization were prohibited, inmates could lodge complaints through
the inmate grievance procedure.226
The Court concluded with a discussion of the role of the public forum
doctrine in prison affairs.227 To establish that a prison was not a public
forum, the Court analogized to a military base and quoted Greer v.
Spock.228 Prison officials thus need only show that their actions were
reasonable. 22 9 As additional support for the application of the reasonable-
ness standard, the Court improperly relied on Martinez. 23 Specifically,
the.Court stated that it would be inappropriate to require officials to show
that the union was dangerous in light of the deference courts should
accord to officials' judgment. 31
Justice Marshall correctly noted in dissent that the Court should have
employed the traditional balancing analysis. 232 After applying this analy-
sis and determining that the bulk mail prohibition should have been
invalidated,233 he discussed the dangerous implications of the majority's
decision.234 Subjecting prison officials' actions to a mere rationality test
would eventually transform prisoners' constitutional rights into
privileges.235 He added, however, that this decision was an "aberration"
resulting from "the very phrase 'prisoner union' [which] is threatening to
those holding traditional conceptions of the nature of penal institu-
tions. "236
Jones signals a significant retreat for prisoners' and nonprisoners'
constitutional rights. Rather than apply traditional first amendment
analysis, the Court used the Pell test.237 This may indicate an intention to
limit Martinez and apply the Pell test for first amendment analysis in the
prison context.
Assuming arguendo that the Court's analysis in Pell was appropriate,
it should not be extended to Jones. Whereas Pell considered visitation
rights, Jones ruled on the right to send and receive publications in bulk.
226. Id. at 2540 n.6.
227. Id. at 2542-44.
228. Id. at 2542-43 (quoting 424 U.S. at 838 n.10).
229. Id. at 2543.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 2545-46.
233. Id. at 2547-48.
234. Id. at 2549.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 2539.
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Because visits pose a greater risk to prison security and order than
publications,23 Martinez should be extended to receipt of publications
analysis even though the Court did not apply it to visitation rights.
Although Jones frequently cited Martinez,239 it did not mention the
Martinez standard. Moreover, the Court changed the tone of Martinez
by quoting phrases from it out of context.24° Martinez invested prison
officals with discretion, but, when constitutional rights were infringed,
it required a showing of necessity to curtail these freedoms.241 It
recognized the need to enforce the Constitution even in the prison
context.242
More importantly, Jones introduced the public forum doctrine to
prison affairs. It was unnecessary to do so, however, because the Court's
extension of Pell disposed of the case. Perhaps the Court introduced this
doctrine to create precedent for applying it when prison authorities'
actions could not be justified even under Pell.
The desire to eliminate time-consuming and frivolous litigation may be
another reason for introducing the public forum doctrine. 243 Under Greer
238. See notes 167-69 supra and accompanying text.
239. 97 S. Ct. at 2538, 2540 & n.6, 2541 n.8, 2542, 2543.
240. Jones quoted the following passage from Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405:
[C]ourts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison
administration and reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than
a healthy sense of realism. Moreover, where state penal institutions are involved,
federal courts have a further reason for deference to the appropriate prison
authorities.
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 97 S. Ct. at 2538 (footnote
omitted). Martinez, however, added an important caveat which Jones failed to acknowl-
edge: "But a policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take cognizance
of valid constitutional claims whether arising in a federal or state institution. When a
prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal
courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights." 416 U.S. at 405-06.
241. 416 U.S. at 405-06.
242. Jones and Pell may have paid lip-service to the idea that outsiders' and prisoners'
constitutional rights warrant protection in the prison environment but the standards
articulated in these two cases indicate that the protection actually afforded these rights
would be minimal.
243. The federal judiciary is overburdened and the Court has expressed concern about
the overload's deleterious effects on the judicial system. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 522-23 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Prisoner complaints
contribute substantially to this problem. See, e.g., Justice, Prisoners' Litigation in the
Federal Courts, 51 TEX. L. REv. 707 (1973):
Commentators say that the staggering number of [prisoner] petitions filed has
created an intolerable burden on the courts. As if numbers alone were not enough
to discourage even the most indefatigable federalist, nearly every petition is
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v. Spock, 244 if a place were not historically a public forum or if it had a
primary purpose unrelated to this function, the inquiry into whether it
could serve as a public forum would end.245 The Court could summarily
dismiss first amendment prisoner complaints on these grounds. 246 The
need to resolve the Martinez-Pell conflict or to balance the competing
interests of the prisoner and administration would be eliminated.
The argument that the Court had the aforementioned intentions is
strengthened by its disregard of precedent in employing the public forum
doctrine. Public forum analysis is appropriate only when the right to
assemble, demonstrate, or distribute pamphlets is at issue;247 it has not
been applied to the receipt of mail, whether it be direct personal corre-
spondence or publications. 248 The Jones majority was apparently
straining to introduce this mode of analysis to first amendment speech
rights in the prison context. By so doing, the Court may have greatly
reduced the first amendment speech rights of inmates and outsiders
because in a public forum analysis there is no requirement that the means
used be "generally necessary." Once it is determined that the place is
not a public forum, restrictions need only be reasonable. 249
Although Jones may not be a retreat to the "hands-off" doctrine, it
does subject prison officials' actions to a much less rigorous review than
that used in Martinez. Jones may, however, be an aberration. 2 0 The
belief that prison labor unions are wholly inconsistent with the prison
inartfully drawn, requiring the judge to expend more than an ordinary effort to
understand the basis of the claim. Moreover, valid claims are few and far
between.
Id. at 708.
Judge Wyzanski suggests that control of the docket can best be achieved by deciding
cases in such a manner that there is clear precedent. See Wyzanski, An Activist Judge:
Mea Maxima Culpa. Apologia Pro Vita Mea., 7 GA. L. REV. 202, 210-12 (1973).
244. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
245. See notes 43-49 supra and accompanying text.
246. Prisons have not historically served as public forums and the goals of prison
administration are unrelated to use of the prison as such a forum. See Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 97 S. Ct. at 2543.
247. See sources cited note 23 supra.
248. See sources cited note 23 supra.
249. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2532,2543 (1977)
("Since a prison is most emphatically not a 'public forum,' these reasonable beliefs of
appellants are sufficient.").
250. Id. at 2549 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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environment may have influenced the Court. 5 Also, as in Martinez, the
Jones Court limited its holding. By ruling only on bulk mail, the Court
left room for retreat; it could easily distinguish Jones from most cases
involving prisoners' first amendment speech rights. When bulk mail was
at issue, the Court could limit Jones to its facts-it could state that the
notion of a prison labor union was so abhorrent that it controlled the
decision. Clearly, Jones did not end the confusion surrounding prisoners'
first amendment free speech rights; rather, it demonstrates how per-
plexed the Court is by the complex task of balancing first amendment
free speech rights against the tenets of penology.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should repudiate Jones. It not only unduly restricts
free speech rights in the prison environment, but adds a third mode of
analysis to the already confused state of the law. The Court must develop
an analytical framework to guide lower federal courts when prisoners'
first amendment speech rights are at issue. Until the Court articulates a
uniform standard that adequately protects inmates' first amendment free
speech rights, rehabilitation rates will not rise, recidivism will remain a
major problem, and lower federal courts will face much needless litiga-
tion. The adoption of the Martinez test as applied in Cofone would not
only end unnecessary litigation but would also adequately protect the
interests of prison officials, inmates, and the general public. Thus, the
Supreme Court should explicitly adopt this approach at the earliest
opportunity, and hold that prisoners have first amendment free speech
rights-including the right to receive publications.
Alan H. Gluck
251. I therefore believe that the tension between today's decision and our prior
cases ultimately will be resolved not by the demise of the earlier cases, but by the
recognition that the decision today is an aberration, a manifestation of the extent
to which the very phrase "prisoner union" is threatening to those holding tradi-
tional conceptions of the nature of penal institutions.
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